Highlights: Volya is a Russian group of experts and risk consultants accustomed to conflict fields. It hosts the Telegram channel of the same name. RFI joined the Volya team to try to understand what is happening in Ukraine. The group's members say Western weapons play an important role, but not as much as Ukraine would like to think. They say the main fighting force is carried by Soviet weapons, and especially by those manufactured under the USSR and sent by the countries of the former Warsaw bloc.

What is the status of the Ukrainian counteroffensive? Since it began, on both sides of the conflict, information has been scarce, fragmented, and access to the land padlocked. To try to...

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Ukraine: 'Russian troops are acting better today than at the beginning of the conflict'

What is the status of the Ukrainian counteroffensive? Since it began, on both sides of the conflict, information has been scarce, fragmented, and access to the land padlocked. To try to understand what is happening, RFI joined the Volya team, a Russian group of experts and risk consultants accustomed to conflict fields, hosts of the Telegram channel of the same name. Interview with several of its members.

Soldiers from the Cascade unit training in a trench. © Anissa El Jabri / RFI

Text by: Anissa El Jabri Follow

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RFI: We know the silence order passed on the Ukrainian side; On the Russian side, we used to consult the Telegram channels of various so-called "patriotic" groups, bloggers or "Voenkors", these Russian military correspondents embarked with the army as close as possible to the fighting. Their analyses and comments, if they had to be cross-checked and verified, were in any case a kind of window on events and debates within the army, and the various other actors such as volunteers and mercenary groups. We have noticed for about two weeks that in this semi-media ecosystem, there is less and less content. Why do you think this space became almost silent for the first time?

Volya: Almost all military correspondents left the combat zone around 5 and 6 June. They were quarantined for a week to hold their appointment with Vladimir Putin, and then many stayed in Moscow and other Russian cities instead of leaving. What for? Because of the counteroffensive. This also makes it possible, on this side of the conflict, to control what is said, that is all. On the other hand, some Telegram channels have their sources among army officers, but they are usually communications officers, so it cannot potentially be raw information to cross-check. You may have noticed that some of them always talk about heroically defended localities. Their Ukrainian colleagues are in no hurry to try to deny them, because they are in fact waiting for the offensive to continue, for the front line to retreat even further, before affirming the capture of these places. No one talks about it and doesn't want to talk about it. The Ukrainians don't talk about it, because it's their policy, and it works. Russians don't talk, because they don't have the right.

Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said Sunday that the goal of "demilitarizing" Ukraine was "largely accomplished," as he said Kiev now largely uses Western weapons. What do you think?

There are many Western weapons, and they play an important role. The heavy artillery that has been provided certainly increases the effectiveness of the Ukrainian army. But its main fighting force is carried by Soviet weapons, and especially by those manufactured under the USSR and remained in Ukraine, and a little by those sent by the countries of the former Warsaw bloc. These tanks, guns, shells and aircraft are actively used today. A large part of the Ukrainian units use old Soviet guns, and even Russian shells. If we talk about equipment, tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored vehicles, Soviet equipment accounts for about 70% of what is used on the battlefield and for transport. It should be noted that Ukrainian T-64 tanks are the main battle tanks of the Ukrainian army. This is an old Soviet tank. But it was equipped with a fire control system, a navigation system and other elements with French, American and/or Israeli equipment. Thus, the combat qualities of the T-64 tank, produced several decades ago, are quite up to the modern level of Russian T-72 and T-90 tanks.

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Would you go so far as to say that Western weapons can be decisive in this phase of the conflict?

American and German armored vehicles and infantry fighting vehicles play a huge role and have a great ability to protect crews. If a shell hits a Bradley armored vehicle, for example, or hits a mine, soldiers are not necessarily killed immediately. There may be bruises, minor injuries, but everyone stays alive. While Soviet equipment, when hit in the same way, catch fire and the crew dies. Sure, Western equipment is great, but not as much as Ukraine would like. That is why I say that we cannot say that Western equipment plays a direct key role, but that it plays a significant role. This is also obviously the case with missiles, which allow very specific and very powerful strikes over long distances, for example to destroy weapons depots, command or communication posts. And in the case of this use, the Russian army has few counter-battery means.

There has been talk for a very long time in this conflict about the role of drones, but it seems that in recent months, their use has become massive on both sides. A British "think tank" wrote in mid-May that within ten kilometers on both sides of "Line 0", there were on average between 25 and 50 drones on each side, but also that each party loses a lot daily. What is your assessment of this phenomenon? What types of drones and what average distribution between attack and observation? Between small drones at low prices and sophisticated drones?

Yes, drones are actively used by both sides, both for surveillance and combat. The Ukrainian side does not use them more often, and the Russian side has been able to increase its number of drones and their effectiveness by changing the structure and way they are used. The most numerous are in the south. In Zaporizhzhya Oblast, southeast of Donetsk Oblast, east near Bakhmut. Russia has far fewer drones than Ukraine on a line that runs from Svatovo (in the Luhansk region) to Belgorod Oblast. The conflict actually started in 2014, and both sides soon started using civilian drones – in short, anything you can buy on the European or Chinese market, mainly for shooting correction and surveillance of the enemy. In other words, these were small drones operating within a radius of 30 to 40 kilometers, and which are mainly needed to conduct reconnaissance operations, to guide artillery or mortar fire. It was from this time that the Ukrainians and some current components of the Russian army, especially the local militias called "pro-Russian separatists", gained practical experience in the use of drones on a large scale.

But the Russian Ministry of Defense and the military-industrial complex were not very interested in this subject, among other things because it was too cheap for some, and too dependent on training soldiers for others. Because to train them especially for this purpose, it was necessary to change the concept of command and control of the troops. Therefore, when the current military campaign began on February 24, 2022, it turned out that regular army units did not know how to use drones en masse, while the "pro-Russian militias" in Luhansk and Donetsk knew how to do it effectively enough. Now, everyone has understood that drones are good, modern weapons, which allow to have a certain superiority over the enemy. The situation has begun to change. A kind of synergy has developed. Russian authorities have begun to invest in mass production of drones. It started last fall in a very active way. There have also been purchases made from other countries such as Iran (Editor's note: Tehran acknowledged last autumn that it had sold "Shaheed" drones to Moscow, but claims to have done so before the start of the offensive in Ukraine); There are those made via intermediary contractors, there are collections and shipments of civilian drones via the Russian population, and on the other hand, there is active training in their use. Ukrainians were confronted as early as last November with the fact that their advantage over drones was disappearing. And now that fight continues on both sides respectively. We would say that there are on average between twenty and thirty drones on each significant portion of the line. We can therefore say that there is a certain parity today.

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We have heard a lot recently about the Russian Lancet drone and its effectiveness, what can you say?

As for the production of Russian drones, it should be noted that attempts by the European Union and the United States to block deliveries of electronic components and engines that can be used in these drones have failed. All this is actively bought through "grey" secondary imports and quietly arrives in the Russian Federation.

>> Read also: Ukraine: the drone war

In this phase of the counter-offensive, we read more and more, on the Western side, that the Russian army is demonstrating at the moment that it has learned a lot, especially in the combined arms maneuvers. Is this also your analysis?

There is a certain amount of exaggeration, but we cannot fail to note that yes, specifically in the south, Russian troops are acting better today than they did at the beginning of the conflict. This is not only due to the fact that the army has improved and gained experience. In our opinion, this has to do with the personality of one particular general, who has made incredible efforts to ensure that the Russian defense in the south resists the first blows. This is General Mikhail Teplinsky (the head of the airborne forces, Editor's note). He changed the system of assigning commanders from company to brigade level by removing rearguard officers and replacing them with officers with combat experience. There weren't enough officers for everyone, of course. Supervision is even the real Achilles' heel of the Russian army, especially with regard to non-commissioned officers.

But in the units that were able to fight, there were colonels, majors and captains. Still, while efficiency has clearly increased, it cannot be said that the Russian army as a whole has become 100% more combat-capable, because there is still a large percentage of recently mobilized people who are not able to be competent. In fact, depending on the unit, everything is going more or less well. Today, we see that these better-trained units are in the most dangerous directions, which sometimes allows them to achieve successes or, at least, not to suffer significant defeats. For us, the improvement process is still ongoing. The quality of training is improving, the number of experienced veterans is increasing. But it will take another year and a half or two years of conflict and a paradigm shift in the management of the Russian military for a profound change.

By July 1, all groups operating in the so-called "special operation" area must have signed with the Ministry of Defense. Yevgeny Prigozhin, the boss of the Wagner Group, said he was opposed to it. What do you think are the reasons for this decision?

We do not see any politics in that at all. This is a bureaucratic decision and partly a military decision. Since last year, about 200 formations of all kinds have been found to be under the military control of the Ministry of Defense. These are battalions of volunteers from various Russian regions, ranging in size from ten to 200-300 people, training of volunteers recruited by the companies Gazprom, Rosatom, Roscosmos, Rosneft, Rostec, etc. It's a huge flow of people going through different departments, different accounting and different conditions. It's just a big mess. The Ministry of Defence was not sure how to pay who and what. The issue of payments is indeed very complex, and it has become clear that there is simply no unified payment system. The regions sometimes maintain their battalions, which also fight with the equipment of the Ministry of Defence. And when they are killed or injured, it is not clear who will pay them the money. Sometimes everyone pays: the region, the insurance company and the Ministry of Defence. Sometimes only the regions pay; Sometimes no one. And it all got bigger. The number of complaints has increased. The paperwork has taken on such proportions that it could easily overwhelm all the officials in the Department of Defense.

So the decision was made to put things in order and transfer everyone to the department. Initially, as we were told by sources within the Ministry of Defence, this measure did not apply to the Wagner PMC, as the latter carries out missions in Africa and other regions, without being subordinate to the ministry. No one took that role away from Wagner, so no one was going to put him under guardianship. Prigozhin answered the question rather dryly: "Are you going to sign a contract with the Ministry of Defense?" But this answer was dictated by the question itself. That is, he was asked if he would sign, not if it concerned him or not. So he said, "I won't sign." Our interlocutors within the company say that they have not been informed of any request to this effect. In other words, no one is going to force them to sign contracts, no one is going to force them into any framework. Their relationship with the Ministry of Defence does not change. Mercenaries are still mercenaries. Of course, Yevgeny Viktorovich Prigozhin is a great showman, and he likes to make noise. We have all seen and heard many videos and statements, and we will see many more. He loves it, knowing that he has the right to do many things.

>> READ ALSO: Ukraine: what assessment two weeks after the beginning of its counter-offensive?

For the past ten days, the use that would be made by the Russian army of "wet cuts", a defensive device that consists of modifying the course of rivers with artificial flooding, has been highlighted. This would be particularly the case around the strategic cities of Tokmak and Melitopol, located between Zaporizhia and the Sea of Azov. Do you also confirm this use, including in these areas?

Yes, we can see it. It started ten days ago in fact, using the field irrigation system: small locks, and small dams. This is entirely in line with the Soviet concept of defensive combat, and currently entire areas are secured in this way. On the other hand, a problem has arisen: with the use of fertilizer in the fields, contaminated water has ended up in the wells. The soldiers were already collecting rainwater, they thought of everything. But there is no water in many homes. This is a direct consequence of these tactics.

Ukraine: 'Russian troops are acting better today than at the beginning of the conflict'

Ukraine: 'Russian troops are acting better today than at the beginning of the conflict'

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