Amjad Ayman - Gaza
Ten days ago, Israeli Channel 10 published pictures and a video clip of the water wall built by the Israeli army inside the northern border of the Gaza Strip, in order to prevent Palestinian resistance elements from infiltrating Israeli coastal areas.
The channel confirmed that the Israeli army has almost finished its work on a 200-meter barrier of rock and concrete on the border with the Gaza Strip. The barrier consists of a fence above the ground and a combination of a hard-to-penetrate underwater concrete wall.
The wall carries a number of sensors and sensor systems, and reaches a height of more than six meters, filling a gap in the shallow area of water where Israeli boats can not work, but the Israeli Ministry of Environment warned that the wall could destroy Israel's beaches by changing the natural sand deposits Carried by the sea.
Former Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman said the project, launched on May 27, was the first of its kind in the world and would block infiltration from Gaza into Israel via the sea, adding that it would ensure that Hamas' .
The main motivation
The main reason for the construction of the water wall is the blocking of Palestinian infiltration routes into Israel on the northwestern border of the Gaza Strip, after the Israeli media caused a sensation over a year after the recent Israeli aggression on the Gaza Strip in 2014.
| The barrier is two hundred meters long from rocks and concrete (the island) |
The Zikim operation was the first naval commando operation carried out by four fighters after infiltrating through the Gaza Sea to the military post, causing losses among the occupation army, including the pursuit of mechanisms and the detonation of one of them from zero distance and causing other material and human losses not declared by Israel. The perpetrators of the operation were killed during their withdrawal from the site.
Bridging the gaps
According to Palestinian military expert Fuad Obaid, the occupation army is following the system of espionage against the resistance by strengthening the strategy of bridging the border posts and building buffer walls and military armament on the border with heavy equipment.
In contrast, the Palestinian resistance uses military tactics on the ground during incursions or direct attacks, as in the Zikim and Rafah operations during the Israeli aggression in 2014, Obaid said.
| Elements of the "human frogs" belonging to the Qassam Brigades (communication sites) |
"During the first aggression, the occupation tried to carry out field incursions on the territory of the northern Gaza Strip and central Gaza City to eliminate the resistance, but decreased during the second aggression in 2012, and thwarted in the aggression of 2014 a lot of intrusions."
"The factor of surprise confused the occupation army and made it planned to establish barriers and control and support military security and espionage systems near the border," said Obaid.
We waited for him
For his part, the writer and political analyst Talal Awaini that the Qassam Brigades directed the slogan of the occupation at the end of 2015, says "Zikim we waited after." In August of the same year, an Israeli espionage operation was foiled by the Human Frogs Squad, following the monitoring of the resistance and its capture of a trained dolphin with spying equipment.
Al-Awaini pointed out that the Qassam is trying to withhold some information that shows the extent of the failure of the occupation capabilities espionage, especially those within the borders, as part of the strategy of preparing for any military battle or psychological war targeting the occupation elements of the resistance.
In the context, explains national security expert Ibrahim Habib that the occupation follows the Israeli security theory, which began in the seventies of the last century, known as the theory of "safe borders."
The expert adds that the occupation relies on this theory to expand strategic depth, and applied in 1975 when he was able to expand this depth through the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Sinai and the Golan.
Following the Oslo agreement in 1993 to protect the border between the Authority and Israel, the power apparatus turned into a contractor for the occupation, as Habib sees, but after Hamas took over the internal Gaza files after winning the 2006 legislative elections, it changed the equation and rejected security coordination with the occupation.
| Habib: These fortifications are meant to weaken The resistance front and not prevent it (Al Jazeera) |
Test the occupation
"When Israel withdrew from Gaza in 2005, there was an Israeli proposal to build a water line to supervise the smuggling of weapons," says Habib. "But in 2008 when Palestinians blew up the Rafah crossing to enter Egypt and get supplies, an Israeli intelligence report revealed that Hamas introduced "At the time, large quantities of weapons could not be brought in the presence of the Palestinian Authority."
The expert mentioned that Israel did not enter into a real test in a military confrontation on the maritime border. In Lebanon it was a land, and it was the only confrontation between it and Egypt in 1967. In addition, It was clear during the Zikim process in 2014.
"The sea wall is a problem, because it was designed to prevent the fighters from infiltrating directly across the border, but those who managed to cross six kilometers, as in the Zikim operation, will not be able to enter the sea," he said.