After a near-neutral stance at the beginning of the "Al-Aqsa Flood" battle, which exposed it to some criticism, Turkey issued - in the past few days - various statements with a high ceiling, especially from President Erdogan, which suggests a change in Ankara's position on the battle, specifically from the occupying power.
Neutrality:
With the first hours and days of the battle of "Al-Aqsa Flood" – which was initiated by the Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas – Turkish officials issued surprising positions, as they differed from their positions in previous confrontations between the occupation and the Palestinian resistance.
Statements by President Erdoğan, Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, ruling party spokesman Omer Celik and other officials focused on denouncing the "targeting of civilians" and demanding the "immediate and unconditional release of hostages," with the term "hostages" having different connotations from "prisoners." In these statements, Turkish officials called on "all parties" to calm and wisdom and return to dialogue and the political track, focusing on the need to achieve the idea of a two-state solution as the only way out of the current confrontation, which some considered implicit equality between the two sides.
This coincided with the absence of any news about meetings between the Turkish leadership and Hamas leaders during the first days. Although both sides denied Israeli reports claiming that Ankara had asked the leaders of the Palestinian movement to leave its territory, the latter appeared in media interviews from the Qatari capital, not Istanbul.
For many days, politicians and in the Turkish media have repeatedly praised Turkey's "neutrality", its lack of support for either side and its willingness to play the role of mediator to reach a peace agreement. Turkey, like Arab and Muslim countries that have diplomatic relations with Israel, did not withdraw its ambassador there for consultations, nor summoned the Israeli ambassador to protest, preceding the decision of the Israeli Foreign Ministry to withdraw its ambassadors in these countries in anticipation of popular reactions after the bombing of Al-Ahli Hospital in Gaza.
This great difference in Turkey's position from previous confrontations and aggressions on Gaza can be attributed to three main reasons: Ankara's continuation in the path of rapprochement with the countries of the region, and its unwillingness to export an advanced position so that it returns - as happened previously - negatively, and thus taking into account that its position is harmonious with the influential Arab countries, and its keenness to continue relations with Israel; At this stage, the F-16 deal could be finalized and reflected on other files.
There is a noticeable development in Ankara's official rhetoric regarding the aggression on the Gaza Strip, specifically emphasizing the idea that Hamas is not a terrorist organization in a clash with the unified position of Israel and its Western backers.
Change of speech:
This Turkish position has been subjected to some criticism, as it is a retreat from Turkey's own positions in less severe and bloody stations by the occupation, as well as its disproportion to the magnitude of the tragedy in the Gaza Strip and the war crimes committed by the occupation, as well as its incompatibility with the pulse of the Turkish street, which rose up in support of Gaza and Palestine, especially after the massacre of Al-Ahli Hospital.
With the days, important variables have occurred that have increased the embarrassment of the official Turkish position, such as the revelation of the level of lies and forgery in the course of the seventh of October and its outcome, and the Israeli war government's exaggeration in the blood of the residents of Gaza, and all the necessities of life in it, and its indifference to any regional and international criticism or appeals related to targeting civilians and infrastructure, and open American support, including sending aircraft carriers to the Mediterranean, which worried and annoyed Ankara, and the level of popular rejection, in Turkey, of Israeli practices, and the organization of several political parties. Opposition to mass rallies in support of the Palestinian people and their resistance with a much higher ceiling of rhetoric than the government.
In conjunction with these variables, and apparently affected by them, the tone of Turkish official statements has increased in the last few days. In a speech to his party's parliamentary bloc on the twenty-fourth of this month, Erdogan said: His country does not consider Hamas a terrorist organization, but rather "a national liberation movement that struggles to protect its citizens and land," stressing that Turkey cannot remain silent about what is happening, and that it will do everything it can politically, humanitarianly and militarily if necessary, in what seemed to be a reference to the idea of guarantor countries recently put forward by Ankara.
On Saturday, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) organized a mass demonstration in Istanbul in support of the Palestinians and rejection of the crimes of the occupation, during which Erdogan's speech was filled with sharp criticism of Israel, such as calling it a "terror state" and threatening to declare it a "war criminal in front of the world." The reaction to Erdogan's speech came from the Israeli foreign minister, who announced the withdrawal of the diplomatic staff from Turkey to reconsider relations between the two sides.
Practically:
In addition to the previous vocabulary of the speech, the Turkish president announced that he canceled a supposed visit to Israel, and Turkish media had previously said that Ankara had stopped cooperation talks on the gas file. Thus, it can be said that the change in Turkey's position so far is largely confined to the speech, vocabulary and tone, and did not go beyond that to practical spaces. Erdogan's visit was supposed to be after Netanyahu's visit to Ankara, which are unexpected in light of the current war, and the cancellation or temporary freeze of gas talks is an achievement, which greatly reduces its impact as a means of pressure or even a sign of protest.
Therefore, it can be said that the rally called by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and spoken by Erdogan, despite its symbolic importance and supportive language, was directed more inward than external, and it can be assumed that it was mainly motivated by embarrassment from the position of the people, segments of the elites, as well as some opposition parties, all of which seemed ahead of the official position of the state, the government and the ruling party, which is sensitive as the local elections in the country approach. Originally, the invitation of a head of state or a ruling party for a speech festival seemed somewhat reprehensible and an implicit indication that major practical steps were not expected, in addition to coming too late, specifically three full weeks after the start of the aggression on the Gaza Strip.
These developments related to the speech were accompanied by a meeting of the foreign minister with Hamas leaders in Doha and a phone call between Erdogan and the latter's president, Ismail Haniyeh, about which the Turkish statement included stressing the need for a ceasefire, launching a political track, as well as "releasing hostages."
While, given Turkey's capabilities and tools, and returning to its previous positions, there is an ambition to have clearer and more influential practical positions, such as steps related to bilateral relations such as withdrawing the ambassador from Tel Aviv for consultations or for a longer period, and some of which can constitute pressure such as economic cooperation, especially the energy file, and some of which are the following Turkish role with third parties such as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and a number of other countries, in pursuit of practical decisions and real positions that can contribute to deterring The occupation for its crimes, as well as pressure to secure the entry of aid to the Gaza Strip at the required pace and quantities, and possible positive signs at the level of relations with the Palestinian resistance factions, foremost of which is Hamas.
In conclusion, there is a noticeable development in Ankara's official speech regarding the aggression on the Gaza Strip, specifically the emphasis on the idea that Hamas is not a terrorist organization in a clash with the unified position of the occupying power and its Western supporters, as well as the intensity of criticism directed at Israel in terms reminiscent of Turkey's positions and Erdogan's speeches years ago. Meanwhile, on a practical level, the Turkish position is still very far from expectations and ambitions, even from the perspective of realistic politics and possible steps diplomatically and politically, which Ankara can do, and it is better to seek it without delay before it is raided by developments on the ground in Gaza and the region, and political in the region and the world.