The concept of "post-West" or "the decline of the West" has recently begun to become popular in Arab writings, especially those influenced by the nationalist and Islamic framework. This thinking is not new to the Arab mentality, as its roots go back to the first war (1914-1918) and spread to the approach of the sixth decade of the twentieth century. This period saw the spread of the concept of the "fall of Western civilization", derived from many sources. The massacres of the First (1914-1918) and Second (1939-1945) World Wars, and the scale of human, economic, military, and social destruction, have shaken the belief in the validity of Western claims of their value and institutional superiority.
The rise of Islamists since the seventies of the last century, the nationalist idea in the fifties in the entire region, and their adoption of identity discourses also helped to consolidate this understanding, although this discourse also prevailed during the period of the founder Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949) as part of a general problem common at this stage.
With the rise of Islamists, the Islamic regime's superiority over the socialist systems led by the Soviet Union and the capitalist systems led by the United States and Europe began to be formulated in what is to say the least a fabrication that combined the merits of the two systems together without a real understanding that they are of the same nature.
Although the concept of the end of Western civilization was loaded with civilizational loads, it was influenced by political developments; it was founded - first - on the colonial invasion during the Western occupation of the Arab world, then deepened after the United States inherited both France and Britain in its leadership of the West after the second war (1939-1945), and became more established during the period of the United States' sole leadership of the international system after the fall of the Soviet Union (1991/1990). Here we can refer to the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, as the Palestinian cause and the West's support for the Zionist entity have been present since the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948 until now at the heart of the position towards the West.
Are we facing a civilized position on the West based on political friction, or a political position based on a civilized outlook? I think – and God knows best – that the two fed each other, but the dilemma, as described by Dr. Ezz El-Din Shoukry, a professor of political science and former Egyptian diplomat, is that "the West, or the construction of the concept of what is called the West, was an integral part of the Arabs' building of their self-image." I add that the approach of looking at the West and obsessing with it - as will be clear in this article and the next article - is one of the problems that governed our thinking in the twentieth century, and the most dangerous thing is that - that is, this approach of looking - is still extended in the concept of post-West or its decline, which greatly confuses how we think about the world with its various developments and priorities for political action.
The Four Problems of the Concept of the West
The West; a comprehensive, ahistorical concept that includes disparate elements and this is a close feature of the twentieth-century way of thinking based on polarization between opposing dualities, and it is also a reductionist concept based on epistemological certainty because it is linked to ideology: the East versus the West, and the Soviet Union or the Eastern Bloc versus the West.
First: The concept is not historical
The West is a holistic concept used in conflict, so we are in constant conflict with the West without knowing that at the moment when it came into contact in the late eighteenth century, we became in the West and the West became in us. As for the fact that the West has become in us with its intellectual and technical products and economic capitalism, this is clear, but that we have become in the West, as Edward Said, a well-known Palestinian thinker, said in his book "Orientalism", that the "East" or the establishment of the concept of the so-called "East", was an integral part of building Europe for its self-image.
The West is a comprehensive holistic concept that includes different elements, but more importantly, there was a Western-inspired modernist project that was always dealt with and negotiated by the state in the region with its institutions, and a number of social groups. We were not facing a single modernity, but multiple modernities in the West, and the interaction with it also produced in the Arab and even global reality multiple applications for it, and created juxtaposition, mixing and overlap between it and what is called traditional or authentic.
Second: Conflicting Dualities
The West versus East, Islamism vs. secularism, socialism vs. capitalism, the private sector versus the public, authenticity versus contemporary... Etcetera. Thus, concepts abounded, but what governs them is that they are not historical, total, comprehensive - as presented - and of an ideological nature. The ideological is an expression of intellectual purity; it provides a comprehensive explanation of the universe and life and the place of man in them; but it is of a conflictual nature because it is based on confronting ideological opponents, other jealous.
It needs and embodies opposing dualities, even though reality is always contrary to this intellectual purity. Whoever deviates from it is a dissident, as in the experience of the Soviet Union, even though the dissidents were looking for an ideal or better application of it. In the West, McCarthyism was in one of its manifestations in search of ideological purity, and in our Arab world, the concept of Kharijites and later extremism and terrorism was also invoked to describe those who deviate from the ideology of the state, which is of a mixed nature that combines disparate elements. Everyone is looking for ideological purity and perfect application to serve and nurture polarization.
Third: Reduction
Since the fifties, the dominant narrative of the West has pushed for the integration of all Western societies into a single entity, imperialist, that only wants to control the Arab region and its resources, and prevent Arabs from developing themselves and standing on their own two feet, as the writer and thinker Ezzedine Fashir put it in his article.
This definition, which began nationally and developed with Islamic thinkers, includes a definition of "Western culture" as a materialistic culture, lacking spirituality, often morally decadent, not magnanimous and solidarity, dominated by selfishness, bodily desires, and cold calculation of interests.
This may be true if you look at it from a certain angle, but ironically, the writings that criticized the West – such as Edward Said, Ismail al-Faruqi and later Abdelwahab al-Messiri – which represented an intellectual and political repertoire for nationalists and Islamists to support their view of the West, I say that these writings were founded – to a large extent – on Western intellectual projects that criticized modernity.
These figures and those who came after them and criticized the West and its modernity were educated in Western universities, and most importantly, they addressed a question that I do not think has become raised in contemporary times - except in intellectual frameworks - which is the question of the Renaissance. The question of renaissance was abandoned in the post-colonial era as the question of development dominated as a prerequisite for the defense of the nation. In modern times, economic growth has replaced everyone.
Fourth: Based on cognitive certainty
We can adopt stable units of analysis over a long period of time. The state was the basic unit of analysis in politics, and society as a whole as in capitalist analysis, but it could be seen as coherent classes – as in Marxist analysis.
The relative stability of the 20th century helped perpetuate ways of thinking about it. The Cold War, for example, lasted almost half a century (1945-1990), and the first half was marked by conflict between the emerging Germany and its allies and the two main powers of the international system – France and England – and it was only at the end of it that we witnessed a new industrial revolution – the information revolution.
With cognitive certainty, we do not realize the process of concepts and their development, but rather deal with them in their final form, and the goal or destination becomes to reach their comprehensive standards, i.e. the final product, so we are no longer about open ends, but rather one and only station that everyone must reach. In the Arab uprisings, women's demands were integrated into the general demands of the Hirak. This was aided by the overwhelming female presence. In doing so, we went beyond the modus operandi of traditional feminist movements that were influenced by Western compromises and adopted their perspective.
With Massa Amini in Iran (2022), we have witnessed a new development, as women's demands – especially with regard to freedom of dress – were an entry point for public demands related to freedom, dignity and a decent living. The West is no longer facing the East nor authenticity versus contemporary. Concepts are no longer rigid, not completely historical and comprehensive, but in a state of perpetual process and constantly being redefined.
The concept of post-West
A few days ago, our colleague at the Faculty of Economics and Political Science - Cairo University and professor of political science in a number of Arab and American universities - Nasr Aref issued a book entitled "The World After the West", which represents a model that began to become common in Arab thinking, even if its references differ.
This thinking is dominated by the United States' relationship with the Islamic world in the era of its monopoly in the international system after the end of the Cold War, so it stems from a number of intellectual statements that were common or established in this period, such as: the end of history for Fukuyama and the clash of civilizations for Huntington.
The obsession with the West makes confronting the West a priority without seeing in which trench to stand, which may explain why China and Russia are celebrated without having enough standards to look at them.
The concept of post-West is based on the change in the structure of power in the international system with the rise of Russia and China and the non-unilateral hegemony of the United States, and takes its impetus from the end of grand ideas and the decline of the role of international organizations. Nasr Arif believes that the historical moment that begins with the 2009 financial crisis and its aftermath can be considered "the end of the unipolar system, the end of Western exclusivity in managing world affairs, defining the meanings of international legitimacy, and imposing world peace according to the European-American interest. This position thus opens the door wide to future scenarios for the structure of the future international order and the nature of its leadership.
Although he describes this situation as liquid, he believes that it will lead to 4 international phenomena:
First, will our region be better in this era? I say our region, not our governments, and in order not to fall into the disruptive reduction, I say: What is the impact of these developments on different groups of society and not on society as a single bloc?
These capitalist developments and large corporations may benefit, but the small and medium-sized private economy may be harmed, as we have seen in some African countries, where more of China's presence in its economies has eliminated farmers and small entrepreneurs, and this brings us to the second point.
Second, the post-Western concept carries a missionary dimension that the rise of international powers other than the United States and Europe holds a measure of good for humanity, but one of the requirements for dealing with this rise is to have a critical view of the Chinese experience politically and economically, and not to celebrate Russia's further presence in the region. China and Russia protected the Assad regime from international legitimacy – or as he said from Western legitimacy – by using the veto power in the Security Council, and the latter helped the regime of Bashar al-Assad in annihilating its people, but he sees Russia's intervention in Syria as the end of international legitimacy in the Western sense, and of course its invasion of Ukraine is legitimate under the pretext of preserving its national security.
We are dealing with the hegemony of the West as a unified and hostile entity, while rejecting the universality of some components of the values of international legitimacy under the pretext of their political use. This perception of the West makes you reject some of its achievements that may take on a global character; they consider human rights essentially a Western affair, based on Western values, and it is an integral part of the agenda of "Western globalization". I wonder if adopting the post-Western concept involves a bias towards the values of Russian authoritarianism and Chinese dictatorship? Does their rise reinforce this type of governance?
Third, the obsession with the West makes confronting the West a priority without seeing in which trench it stands, which may explain why China and Russia are celebrated without having sufficient standards to look at them.
In my first book after imprisonment (2015-2019), titled "The Narrative of the Arab Spring and the Stakes of Reality" (published by Dar Al-Maraya in Cairo, 2021), I developed a perspective to assess the impact of the rise of China and Russia's greater presence in the region on the basic narrative launched by the Arab uprisings, the essence of which is the search for freedom, human dignity, and social justice. Of course, the concept of post-West does not represent a bias against the Arab uprisings, but our friend Dr. Nasr Arif makes it. He says in the introduction to his book: "The Arab Spring uprisings came, and the intervention of the West fiercely and violently and in a way that lacks international legitimacy to get rid of the regimes that it considers disobedient to it, and a circle outside its orbit, and in return for that, Russia intervened to save Syria from this fate, and then President Putin began to use the ambitions of Turkish President Erdogan to confuse NATO."
Fourth, this concept confuses the end of the unipolar international order with the end of the West in the civilized sense. Our friend Nasr said: "The Cold War has returned again between civilizationally and culturally distinct entities, on the basis of their economic appearance and their essence is civilizational." I wonder with him what is the essence of civilization in the Chinese experience? Is Putin's civilizational jargon in the face of the West with his invasion of Ukraine enough to talk about a civilized essence to compete between them? More importantly, can China and Russia get rid of the capitalist nature of the economy? Will their rise replace state capitalism with market capitalism? Questions worth following closely.
I am aware that there is a conflict over the norms that should govern the work of international institutions, in various fields such as the Internet, climate change and international trade, but it is a conflict that is not of a civilized nature; it is dominated by political competition and the search for economic interests. Was there a disagreement between the Soviet Union and the West in the essence of civilization, or were they of the same nature in terms of material progress and a desire for human control over nature, even if they took different manifestations in terms of economic and political expression of them while we are in the process of a similar experience?
Anyone reading this article may think that I am advocating for the West's continued domination of the world, but what I am looking for is a better understanding of the world that allows us to rethink our political agenda, which will be my concern in the next article.