There are many narratives of what the future will look like in the Middle East. There is almost a consensus among scholars in the region and beyond that a new Middle East is taking shape, but each sees it according to his own perspective determined by the position he occupies, his awareness of the interests he represents, or the specialization to which he belongs.
The division of history into different periods based on one or more determinants and a particular development is a novelty made by historians and researchers. Despite the multiplicity and variation of narratives, there is generally no narrative that can express significant sectors of society, such as youth, who represent about a third of Arab society (10%) in the age group between 24 and 29 years. A third of those wishing to work are "unemployed" and half are looking to emigrate, according to a survey released a few days ago.
Six determinants
In his latest book on the contemporary Middle East, James L. Gilvin, professor of modern Middle Eastern history at the University of California, Berkeley, has 6 characteristics of the new Middle East, as stated in the introduction to the book he co-edited with former Tunisian President Moncef Marzouki (2011-2014):
First: The repercussions of the 2010-2011 uprisings
"While it's too early to know their long-term effects, governments across the region – which have been able to withstand the unrest – have become more dependent on a combination of brute force, elite cohesion, external support and bribery to sustain themselves," the historian says.
"None of the solutions these regimes have come up with will bring long-term relief to their legitimacy crisis."
Therefore, we are facing a crisis of legitimacy for the existing regimes, which may find its deepest root, as I wrote in previous articles, in that they try to respond according to the old authoritarian logic to the challenges of the public, whose demands have increased, whose expectations have risen, and who have multiple tools that have made it more powerful and empowered. Arab governments respond without real renewal to unfair social contracts in which they have sided with certain social groups at the expense of others.
Second: The spread of sectarianism
Sectarianism spread as a result of what happened in Iraq after the US invasion in 2003, and what Syria suffered after the 2011 uprising.
What makes the current spread of sectarianism in the Middle East even more tragic is that once it takes root, it simply doesn't disappear over time. People themselves separate their own affiliation for safety or comfort, as happened in Iraq and Syria, or countries allocate representation and rights according to religious affiliation, as in Lebanon."
Individualism and diversity in their forms can be a basis for re-exploring the concept of "diversity citizenship" as the primary driving force for community development, and an indirect way to heal the wounds of identity-related conflicts. While collective identities and communication structures are likely to continue to play an enormous role, their polarizing capacities within divided societies could weaken if a new focus on individual freedoms and rights occurs.
Identities are now defined not in holistic collective frameworks, but according to a logic of rights and freedoms that usually acquires an individual meaning. Nubians in Egypt and Amazigh in North Africa are looking for rights and freedoms in expressing belonging to their identity. The ground of freedoms and rights can help to have common denominators with others who do not belong to the same identity, as women's rights and feminist movements intersect their demands for rights and freedoms with the aspirations of the Amazigh and Nubians.
In the fields of the Arab uprisings, we witnessed the beginning of the formation of these common grounds, where the squares of Iraq, Lebanon, Algeria, Sudan, and before them Egypt, Morocco, Syria and Yemen included multiple tributaries of protest. What they all had in common was an aspiration for human dignity, justice and freedom.
Thus, if the uprisings unleashed sectarianism, they also launched a movement towards a diversity citizenship based on rights and freedoms rather than sectarian affiliation.
Third: Abandoning Westphalia
"Westphalia" refers to the principles of respect for State sovereignty and non-interference. Since the end of the 18th century (Napoleon's conquest of Egypt in 1798), the region has been witnessing great power intervention, arguably nothing has changed since then. The Yemen war in the mid-sixties and Syrian-Egyptian unity in 1958 are just examples of regional powers interfering in the affairs of other countries.
This is the novel being promoted, but what about the others?
"Arguably, much of what came to regenerate the region after 2011 is nothing more than a continuation of phenomena that already existed," said James L. L. Gilvin.
Arab states are still seeking rents as they once were. The region remains an integral part of the global economic system that prioritizes neoliberalism, having given commercial and industrial capitalism the lead in the 19th and 20th centuries. Arab states continue to fall short of human rights, accountability, transparency and the rule of law, and populations continue to suffer from low human security in many areas, from education and health care to good governance to access to adequate food and water supplies.
Regardless of whether the phrase "new Middle East" refers to something completely new and distinctive or to the crystallization of past dynamics, what we should pursue is not China's Belt and Road projects, America's withdrawal or repositioning, nor the liberation of the unipolar international order, but the impact on specific social sectors.
Will the region's swelling youth find jobs in Silk Road projects that guarantee them a decent life, or replace state-led Chinese capitalism with U.S.-led market capitalism?
Fourth: The Demographic Dimension
Here comes the repeated talk of massive population growth, resource shortages, climate change, and the swelling of the number of young people and their aspiration to work and marry.
Demographics are an important determinant of the future of the Middle East, but unless approaches are changed, we will not advance much in the debate.
In many societies in the region, the state has withdrawn from many of the tasks it has been undertaking. This void in the economy, jobs and housing construction has been filled by society. Remittances from migrant workers, jobs created by the informal economy, informal housing, civil society work are just a few examples of what people can do.
The authority's view of the population as a burden, and the citizens' expectation that the state returns to perform the previous functions must end completely, and this is what requires another narrative from the two.
Fifth: The absence of hegemonic power
What is meant in the book by hegemonic power is that which plays the role of a factor of regional stability and mitigates conflicts in the region, which distinguishes the current period from the previous one.
But can we ask about the meaning and features of stability? Can there be common ground among regional, international and local actors in building its components? These questions are not margins on the body of the conversation about the dominant power, but rather the original text.
I previously wrote on Al Jazeera Net that there is a growing demand for stability from all actors in the Arab region and a desire to invest in it, but the competition among them over determining the content of that stability and trying to impose it, one of the main reasons behind what has become known in the region's studies as "Arab turmoil."
The search for an imperialist hegemonic power – as in the British Empire before or now the United States – or a regional power in the region or an alliance between some regional states, or a hybrid of this and that, is that it treats the region as a vacuum that does not have self-efficacy and internal forces whose aspirations must be taken into account.
What I have put forward earlier and what I offer now is that the long-term stability of the region will only be achieved in a space where the multiple definitions of stability intersect as presented by different actors. The starting point is the consensus that can be achieved nationally and among the countries of the region first on the concept, and then called upon by international powers to maintain and ensure it.
The Saudi-Iranian agreement, which is now faltering, is a proof of what we say. Both sides realized that they were due to considerations related to the cost of competition or conflict in which there was neither a victor nor a defeated, and that creating conditions for economic growth was required. Both sides realized this, and international support from one of the major world powers with significant economic interests (China) branched out of this agreement.
This model will be strengthened by integrating it with the aspirations and interests of social groups, such as businessmen and segments of society wishing to settle to achieve sustainable economic growth whose results will benefit wider segments.
Any stumbling block in this model or slowdown will result in the entry of international or regional parties with interests contrary to what has been agreed upon, seeking to sabotage it.
Sixth feature: the diminishing importance of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
But James L. Gilvin asks: At whom has this importance diminished?
It has diminished in the West, but China and Russia are now investing some of their resources in it.
The official Arab system has diminished, but a significant part of the peoples of the region takes any opportunity to express solidarity with the Palestinians and their rejection of normalization with the Zionist entity.
The decreasing importance obscures the entry of new generations of young men and women into the arena of resistance in new forms, in addition to the integration and interdependence of these arenas.
The decreasing importance ignores the changes in Israeli society and the cracks it is witnessing that allow new movements in the Palestinian arena – if well exploited – and does not take into account the new generations in the American Democratic Party and the Jewish youth in the United States, whose opposition to Israeli policies is on the rise and their support for them decreases.
Our historian concludes the book's introduction: "Despite all this, the Middle East faces countless chronic problems that may change the course of its history forever. Human security in the region is weak, and has been weakened by the COVID-19 pandemic. The region is suffering, or will soon witness, population growth that strains available resources and state capabilities, climate change that has already caused desertification and ocean level rise, which in itself threatens to bring floods to 43 densely populated coastal areas, high poverty rates along with high levels of income inequality, corruption and lack of transparency, with deficiencies in democracy and human rights, declining industrialization and poor economic performance, lack of participation in the global economy, in addition to the established patriarchal system that economists consider the first block of development. "The large number of refugees and the largest number of internally displaced people in any region of the world, and the list goes on."
Is the new Middle East here or there in the six determinants?
Isn't it better to look at the influence of determinants on these factors and recall narratives that are absent voluntarily or involuntarily? Governments in the region are not expected to adequately address any of the deep-rooted ills facing their people.