The eyes of those following the events of Niger are heading towards Abuja, the capital of Nigeria, next Thursday, the tenth of August 2023, to see what will result from the meeting of the leaders of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on the possibility of military intervention, which it threatened in its emergency meeting in Abuja also on July 30, which included giving the putschists a week's deadline, which ended last Sunday, for the return of President-elect Mohamed Bazoum, with a package of economic and trade sanctions, a ban on flights to and from Niger, and a travel ban on leaders The coup and their families.

The question arises: will ECOWAS intervene with military forces to carry out its threats, or are there other possibilities? And what are these possibilities?

The truth is that before this and that, another obvious question arises: has ECOWAS ever intervened militarily in similar situations? What are the bases for the intervention? What are the main challenges to this intervention, and perhaps repeated in the case of Niger?

First of all, it can be said that ECOWAS, although it is an economic community that seeks integration among West African countries, has security and military interests, considering that achieving economic integration requires a state of political and security stability, and therefore it was one of the first African sub-organizations to develop security charter structures, represented in the 1978 Non-Aggression Protocol and then the ECOWAS Defense Charter in 1981, which spoke about the phenomenon of collective security.

The latter Charter allowed intervention in specific situations, including the existence of an internal conflict managed and supported from outside that threatens peace and security, and the Protocol of the Mechanism for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts in the Community in 1999, one of the most important provisions of which was to expand the base of intervention, as Article 25/3 of its Protocol stipulates that it is permissible to intervene in internal conflict in the event of the threat of a humanitarian catastrophe, or the existence of acts of violence that violate human rights and the rule of law significantly, or in the event of the overthrow of an elected government.

To further emphasize the idea of democracy and prevent military intervention in governance, the Brotherhood added in December 2001 a new protocol to the mechanism's protocol known as the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, which addresses the causes and roots of conflicts, including corruption and instability, and deals with several issues, most notably the freedom and integrity of elections, civil society supervision of the military institution, and rejection of unconstitutional changes in systems of government.

Previous ECOWAS military interventions

Thus, the group intervened militarily based on these protocols in many cases in the nineties; in Liberia, where the civil war took place and confronted President Charles Taylor, and in Sierra Leone to restore President Tejan Kabbah, who was overthrown in the 1996 coup.

But these two interventions in particular were mainly related to Nigeria, whose then president, Ibrahim Babangida, sought to play the role of the region's leading state, sending the largest number of intervening troops and bearing 90 percent of the funding.

However, with the departure of Babangida, the arrival of another leadership such as Abdessalam Abubakar, followed by Ulisson Obasanjo, and the focus on the country's internal problems, ECOWAS involvement in the conflicts declined, which was highlighted in the conflict in Guinea-Bissau in the same period, where Nigeria did not send troops, ECOWAS only sent limited forces that were ineffective, withdrew soon after, and the financing process fell on France.

It is recently noted that the group did not intervene militarily in the recent Malian and Burkina Faso coups almost two years ago, and only suspended their membership, imposed economic and trade sanctions, and gave a deadline to the coup leaders to carry out the democratic transition process, but it has not been adhered to so far, and the group has not taken escalatory measures represented in military intervention in them.

This means that if the group has the right to intervene militarily, this intervention is linked to several problems, whether it is political problems - the compatibility of the political will to intervene with the member states of the organization - or financial problems such as providing the necessary funding for intervention, or even problems related to the acceptance of public opinion in the intervening state. Are these considerations available in the case of the Niger?

Low probability of military intervention in Niger

Arguably, the likelihood of ECOWAS military intervention in Niger remains low, but still possible, for multiple reasons.

The exclusion of putschists in Niger requires a direct military confrontation, and the number of forces of at least 10,<> to confront a regular army, and these are difficult to provide in an easy time, especially since the coup leaders have prepared for that.

Political considerations

Given the considerations related to the extent to which the ECOWAS countries support this intervention, it can be said that there is a state of division within the Community, between countries that support intervention, led by Nigeria and Senegal, and countries that reject intervention, namely Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea. Of course, the reason for the rejection is that the ruling regimes came to power through the coup. There is the third group, which has not defined its exact position on intervention, although it is inclined towards a political settlement.

Newly elected Nigerian President Paula Ahmed Tinobo faces several problems, including the existence of enormous economic and security problems, most notably the fight against Boko Haram spread in many states, and therefore the withdrawal of part of his country's forces to Niger may affect the efficiency of the internal confrontation process, and the occurrence of a state of security liquidity in Niger Instability could contribute to the flow of IS and other elements from Libya through Niger to Nigeria and other neighboring countries, as well as an economic bill that is difficult to pay on its own.

Finally, the country's Senate rejected the president's request for intervention. It is true that the president may take a decision contrary to the constitution in the event of a threat to peace and security in the country, but he may not take this step alone so quickly, especially since the main opposition forces also refuse to intervene and are inclined to political solutions.

Financial considerations

This was clearly demonstrated during the interventions of the group's forces known as "Ecomoj" in the cases of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau in the nineties of the last century; in the Liberia crisis, the initial agreement was that each participating country would finance its participating forces during the first month, after which the responsibility would fall on the group.

The same happened in Sierra Leone, where Nigeria also bore most of the expenses of the Ecomog mission, although the protocol of the Conflict Prevention Mechanism adopted by the Community in 1999 stipulated the methods of financing, including the contributions of member states, and the possibility of obtaining foreign assistance, but it did not specify specific contribution rates, and resorting to foreign aid allows donor countries to impose their agenda on the forces. Intervening.

The weakness of the self-financing process may open the door to external funding, and the caveats that this carries that harm the group more than good, and are inconsistent with its goals, with its former executive secretary Lansai Kouyaté warning of the danger of the external financing process, saying, "If we rely 100% on donors, all the good ideas that the group seeks to achieve will not materialize."

Nature of the functions of the intervening forces

Will the troops be peacekeepers or peace enforcement? There is a big difference between the two: imposing peace entails combat missions, weapons and heavy equipment, as well as high cost, not to mention the expected human and material losses.

Thus, the exclusion of the putschists in Niger requires a direct military confrontation, and the number of forces of at least 10,<> to confront a regular army, and these are difficult to provide in an easy time, especially since the coup leaders prepared for that, and they closed the borders, and redeployed forces, in addition to the fact that the coup leader was at one time the commander of the forces of the intervening group in Ivory Coast.

He therefore knows very well the nature of the forces involved, the strengths and weaknesses and so on. Not to mention the announcement of Mali and Burkina Faso that they stand by the putschists, which means that the intervening forces will not only face a regular army, but will confront the armies of other countries allied with it, which means prolonging the war on the one hand, and increasing the bill for material and human losses on the other hand.

Possible collapse and weakening of the group's effectiveness

We are referring to the group, which since the first intervention in Liberia has been witnessing a state of division between the Anglophone countries led by Nigeria and the Francophone countries led by Côte d'Ivoire at the time, and the crisis of mistrust between the two blocs, and its impact on its effectiveness in the intervention process. In the recent Niger crisis, we find this division not only between supporting and opposing states, but also the latter threatening to withdraw from the group, which could affect its strength and effectiveness.

Other non-military alternatives

While the likelihood of ECOWAS intervention remains low due to the above considerations, there may be two other possibilities for ECOWAS leaders at Thursday's meeting:

  • The first is to extend the deadline granted to the putschists and give a chance for diplomatic solutions, especially in light of the tendency to do so by the United States and evidenced by the statements of Victoria Nuland, assistant secretary of state of the United States, the deposed Prime Minister of Niger, and others. This may be acceptable, especially given the unwillingness of the forces to intervene.

However, this may lose ECOWAS credibility, especially in light of the wave of escalation it has pursued since the beginning of the crisis, and we may see the group's tendency to this option through the statements of its Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, Abdel Fattah Moussa, despite his confirmation of the existence of a plan for military intervention, he stressed that the countries of the group hope to reach a political solution, and give the coup leaders all possible opportunities to restore power to the elected president, Mohamed Bazoum.

  • Second: Agreeing on a transitional period to hold presidential and parliamentary elections that do not allow the party of the ousted President Bazoum to participate in them, as it ends with the departure of the putschists, for a period usually ranging from one to two years, as happened in Mali and Burkina Faso, but the problem remains that the putschists fulfill their promises, as there was a reneging on this in the case of Mali specifically, and the military demanded a transitional period of 5 years and not 18 months as agreed. The group did not take any other interventions.

Finally, the Community's decision to intervene in Niger is plagued by several internal, regional, and even international obstacles, which means that the decision to extend the deadline may be optimal until further notice.