Are Turkish-Russian relations in crisis?

Turkey's agreement to refer Sweden's NATO membership file to parliament coincided with Russia's refusal to renew the Black Sea grain export agreement and the postponement of a supposed visit by Putin to Ankara, sparking debate about the possibility of Turkish-Russian relations entering a crisis.

Hard balance

Despite Turkey's membership in NATO decades ago and being the second military power in NATO after the United States of America, it has been able in recent years to weave more than good relations with its traditional adversary Russia, and this meant Ankara's exit from the Cold War mentality and the formulation of a different foreign policy according to the vision of advancing Turkish interests in the first place, but it was also driven by several additional reasons.

At the forefront of this is the diverse interests that unite Ankara and Russia, especially in the economic and commercial fields, including their involvement in several issues and disputes jointly, which imposed the need for understanding to avoid any unwanted clash, and then Ankara's annoyance with several positions of its Western allies in which it saw as abandoning it or even a stab from them in the back, especially with regard to the continuous US support for separatist organizations in northeastern Syria.

Therefore, despite the crisis of the downing of the Russian plane in the fall of 2015, Turkish-Russian relations quickly reached advanced levels, especially after the failed coup attempt in 2016, and can be described as strategic in several fields.

The postponement of an upcoming visit by the Russian president to Turkey prompted the analysis in a different way, and the Russian position promised a message of protest against Turkey this time

The two sides have significantly developed their trade and tourism relations, and cooperated on projects with a strategic dimension in the field of energy security, such as the Turkish Stream natural gas project, the Akkuyu nuclear power plant and the Russian president's proposal to transport gas to Europe via Turkey.

Ankara also concluded the S-400 defense system deal with Moscow, which caused a major rift in its relations with Washington, as well as the more than good relations between the two countries at the leadership level and from the point of view of personal relations between Erdogan and Putin.

From this angle, the Russian-Ukrainian war narrowed the margins of Turkish maneuver and increased Western pressure on it regarding relations with Russia, and despite that, it has maintained a position distinct from NATO to a large extent, refusing to engage in Western sanctions on Moscow, and controlling the sharpness of its statements and positions towards Russia despite condemning the war, and continuing in good relations with the latter despite all developments, in addition to its involvement in mediation between Moscow and Kiev, through which it achieved some breakthroughs, such as the gathering of the foreign ministers of the two countries and an agreement Grain export and prisoner exchange agreement.

A message of protest or a crisis?

The policy of expanding NATO in the east poses a major challenge to Russia, and it may have been one of the reasons for the current war in Ukraine, and despite the recent change in tone of Russian statements regarding the details of this file, Russia's strategic view of it cannot be underestimated.

However, Turkey's approval of Finland's accession to NATO in March did not constitute a crisis between Ankara and Moscow, as the latter had switched its threat of retaliation if Sweden and Finland joined the alliance to retaliate if its weapons were deployed on their soil.

However, Turkey's initial approval of Sweden's membership file and its referral to parliament coincided with Russian positions that suggested a different position this time, as the latter announced its unwillingness to renew the agreement on the export of grains across the Black Sea, a step it had previously taken more than once in protest against Western policies or what it sees as an inaccurate implementation of the agreement that does not take into account the part related to it, but it had returned to the agreement with a Turkish diplomatic effort each time.

If the Russian announcement referred the reasons for the withdrawal to the position of European countries and Washington, but the postponement of an upcoming visit by the Russian president to Turkey prompted the analysis in a different way, and the Russian position was considered a message of protest against Turkey as well this time, to what extent does this analysis seem accurate?

There is no doubt that the Russian position on the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO has become more sensitive recently with regard to the war in Ukraine in terms of field developments related to the Ukrainian counterattack and in terms of Western positions on the war in support and armament of Kiev, especially in accordance with the decisions of the recent NATO summit in Vilnius, as well as in terms of some Russian developments themselves, such as the recent Wagner rebellion and its repercussions.

Therefore, sending a Russian letter of protest to Turkey after the recent position on Sweden is undoubtedly part of the assessment, as there is no other clear reason to explain the postponement of Putin's visit – important for Moscow – without giving clear reasons, let alone setting an alternative date.

On the second of August, the communication department in the Turkish presidency announced a phone call between Erdogan and Putin, and said that they "agreed to the visit of the Russian president to Turkey," but did not specify a date for it, and the communication department was keen to give details of the topics addressed by the contact and they were many, foremost of which was the visit as well as the grain export agreement.

In the call, the Turkish president stressed the importance of Russia's return to the agreement, which he described as a "bridge of peace" and that "stopping it for a long time is not in the interest of anyone, especially poor countries in need of grain."

According to the Kremlin, Putin has stressed his country's readiness to return to the agreement "if the West implements its relevant obligations," and the statement also indicated that the two sides agreed to continue preparations for a "possible meeting" between Erdogan and Putin.

In conclusion, there is a noticeable change in Turkish-Russian relations on the one hand, specifically after the recent developments in Ukraine and the Turkish position on Sweden's membership, but this change has not reached and is not likely to soon reach the point of crisis between the two sides, as well as estrangement.

On the one hand, there is a range and an hour of core interests that unite the two parties, and on the other hand, the common files in which the two countries cooperate are also many, and their involvement together in several regions makes any real crisis between them a potential door to a confrontation with a heavy price for both, and Turkey is very keen to maintain a state of relative balance as much as possible in its relations with Russia and the United States.

Most importantly, Turkey's approval of Sweden's membership in NATO is neither final nor immediate, but is linked on the one hand to the return of the Turkish parliament to work after the holiday next October and then to a constitutional process that will require time, as well as to the extent to which Ankara is convinced of Stockholm's commitment to the terms of the agreement, and therefore the latter's membership is either not guaranteed or at a minimum may not be very close, which opens up space for dialogue and the possibility of influencing the decision, in addition to Russia realizing that Ankara's ability to resist NATO pressure In this regard, it is not absolute, especially since it was almost the only country that refused to do so, so Turkey's approval is not a deliberate hostile stance against it.

Therefore, as long as the Russian-Ukrainian war has not yet rolled towards a full, comprehensive and direct confrontation between Russia on the one hand and NATO on the other, and as long as Turkey remains with spaces of maneuver, communication and diplomatic work with the Russian side, it is unlikely that relations between Ankara and Moscow will reach a major or real crisis, which keeps the recent Russian reaction within the scope of the message of protest or reproach under the roof of the existing system of relations and opens the door to the possibility of resolving it in the foreseeable future.